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CLASS ACTION REFORM: LESSONS FROM 
SECURITIES LITIGATION 
Jill E. Fisch· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most damaging accusations made against class action litigation, 
particularly securities litigation, is the claim that it is "lawyer-driven litigation."' In 
the parlance of, among others, the proponents of the Republican Contract with 
America, lawyer-driven litigation is inherently abusive.2 Recent reform efforts, 
including the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "Reform 
Act"),' have been spurred by the effort to transfer control of litigation away from 
lawyers and back to clients.' 
One component of the Reform Act's attack on abusive litigation was the 
adoption of a lead plaintiff provision.' By vesting control in the hands of substantial 
shareholders, especially institutional investors, Congress attempted to reduce the 
ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to exercise control over securities litigation.' This 
approach typifies more general efforts to reform class action litigation. Criticisms of 
recent developments in class action litigation have focused on the attorney-client 
relationship and upon the agency costs created by the substantial control exercised by 
* Copyright 1996 Jill E. Fisch. I am grateful to J. Scott Colesanti and Stanley M. 
Grossman for the information they provided. 
1. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 202 (1995) (the "Common Sense Legal 
Reforms Act") (provision entitled "Prevention of Lawyer-Driven Litigation"). 
2. See NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 147-54 (1994) (describing 
problems caused by attorney control of litigation process). 
3. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S. C. §§ 77a et seq. (1994 & Supp. I 1995)) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
4. See, e.g., H .R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369 (1995), Joint Explanatory Statement of the 
Committee of Conference-The "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," reprinted 
in 141 CONG. REc. Hl3691 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (hereinafter "Conference Report") 
(describing "abusive practices committed in private securities litigation" as including "the 
manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent"). 
5. Reform Act, supra note 3 (adding Sec. Act§ 27(a)(3); Sec. Ex. Act§ 21D(a)(3)). 
6. See Conference Report, supra note 4, at Hl3700 (describing the Reform Act as 
"protect[ing] investors who join class actions against lawyer-driven lawsuits by giving control 
of the litigation to lead plaintiffs with substantial holdings of the securities of the issuer"). 
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the lawyer/agent' in class action cases.• 
This Article will evaluate both the theoretical underpinnings of the lead plaintiff 
provision and the insights provided by its limited application to date. It will focus 
upon the efficacy of encouraging institutional investors to participate actively in the 
litigation process as a means to counteract lawyer-driven litigation. One possible 
result of the lead plaintiff provision may be to transform securities fraud litigation 
from prototypical small claimant cases into cases in which the active participants have 
meaningful stakes in the litigation, but in which the needs and interests of the class 
representative may diverge from those of the members it represents. By considering 
securities litigation against the general backdrop of class actions, this Article will 
explore the relative effects of lawyer control of the litigation process in small claimant 
cases versus large claimant cases. 
This analysis suggests two central insights. First, this Article questions the ability 
of a lead plaintiff provision or other similar procedural reforms to effect a meaningful 
change in the control of class action litigation. Second, the Article challenges the 
purported value of client control. In cases in which the damages suffered by 
individual class members are small, the value of litigation cannot be judged solely by 
reference to class member recovery. A defense of the class action structure, in 
securities cases as well as other class actions, requires a richer conception of the 
litigation objectives than plaintiff compensation. Unless and until those objectives are 
clarified, reform initiatives will be limited in their capacity to identify and remedy 
abusive litigation. 
H. THE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT 
In December 1 995, Congress adopted the Reform Act over the veto of 
President Clinton.' The Act was the culmination of several years of reform efforts 
directed both to abusive litigation practices generally and to private securities fraud 
7. Litigation generally is characterized by the fact that disputes are resolved through 
lawyers as agents for disputing principals. For more general analyses of the effect of this 
agency structure, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 509 (1994) 
(arguing that, by using agents, principals are better able to commit to cooperation); Rachel 
Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation? 
Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1997) (providing experimental 
support for Gilson/Mnookin model). 
8. See generally Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. 
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (describing counsels' failure to act 
ethically in Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc. litigation); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas 
in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469 (1994) (proposing new ethical standards for 
lav,ryers in mass tort cases); Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role 
in Class Actions and Derivative Suits: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for RefomJ, 
58 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1991) (describing consequences of divergence of interest between class 
action attorneys and their clients). 
9. Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. 
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cases in particular.'0 The Reform Act reflected congressional efforts to address a 
frequently repeated description of abusive litigation." The abuse scenario portrayed 
plaintiffs' lawyers as responding to corporate announcements of bad news or a 
drop in stock price" with hastily drafted complaints containing poorly supported 
allegations of fraud." Defendant businesses were frequently pressured to settle even 
frivolous cases because of the enormous financial burden of litigation." The 
resulting settlements provided little financial benefit to the daimed victims of the 
fraud, the class of plaintiff stockholders, but compensated plaintiffs' lawyers with 
multi-million dollar fee awards." 
This scenario, although challenged as inaccurate or atypical by many," conveyed 
two related concerns: the initiation of meritless claims and the distortion of 
settlements. The control of litigation decisions by class action lawyers rather than 
clients was identified as a factor contributing to both problems. Lawyers were 
accused of filing frivolous cases solely for their settlement value" and for targeting 
defendants because of their financial resources rather than their culpability." The 
1 0. !d. at 7 1 7-24 (describing legislative background to adoption of Reform Act). 
11. See Conference Report, supra note 4, at Hl3699-1 3700 (describing abusive 
litigation practices to which Reform Act was addressed). 
1 2. Witnesses in 1 993 hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities referred to 
a " 1  0% rule" under which they claimed plaintiffs' attorneys would automatically file suit 
whenever a company' s stock price dropped by 1 0% or more in a single day. Joel Seligman, 
The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARv. L. REV . 438, 442 (1994) (citing Private Litigation Under 
the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 1 03d Cong., 1st Sess. 280 ( 1 993)). 
1 3 .  See, e. g., In re Philip Morris Sec. Litig . ,  872 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1 995) 
(describing complaints filed within five hours of announcement by Philip Morris that it was 
lowering cigarette prices as drafted so hastily that they erroneously described Philip Morris as 
being in the toy industry), aff'd in part, 7 5  F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1 996); Common Sense Legal 
Reform Act, 1995: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Finance of the House 
Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, 223 ( 1 995) (statement of former SEC 
Chairman Richard C. Breeden) (describing "canned" complaints often filed within a few hours 
of a stock price drop). 
14. See, e.g. ,  Peter M. Saparoff, The Private Securities Litigation Refmm Act of 1995: 
Illusion or Reality, ALI-ABA, May 1 0, 1996, at 505 (describing "blackmail effect" of 
securities litigation as forcing "innocent" companies to settle). 
1 5. Id. (describing argument that most of the millions of dollars paid in securities fraud 
settlements was paid to plaintiffs' attorneys). 
1 6. See, e.g. , Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 78 (stating that "[m]ost observers agree 
that strike suit litigation is relatively unconunon"); William S. Lerach, Prevalence and 
Economic Impact of Securities Class Actions: Is Reform Necessary?, in PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE, AVOIDING AND MANAGING SECURITIES LITIGATION AND SEC ENFORCEMEl'fT 
INQUIRIES FOR IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 1 995 , at 24-25 ( 1 995) (providing statistical analyses 
challenging congressional findings about abusive securities litigation); James Bohn & Stephen 
Choi , Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 903 ,  905 ( 1 996) (characterizing �he frivolous securities lawsuit as a "much­
debated phenomenon"). 
17 .  See, e.g., Securities Litigation Refonn: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Telecomm. and Finance of the Hm1se Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 
22 ( 1 994) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (claiming that "many cases are filed just to coerce 2 
settlement"). 
1 8. See Conference Report, supra note 4, at Hl3699 (describing targeting of accounta;-1ts 
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costs of defense imposed pressure on defendants to settle even weak cases,,. pressure 
that was aggravated by the financial incentives created by the third party payment 
structure of insurance and indemnification.'o 
The settlement process also contributed to the problem. Individual shareholder 
claims tended to be relatively small, so class members had little incentive to monitor 
the litigation of the case and the settlement decision." Plaintiffs' lawyers, on the other 
hand, had an incentive to maximize their fee relative to the amount of work they 
invested in the case, a motivation that bore no necessary correlation to the size of the 
recovery to class members." The large size of the lawyers' economic interests relative 
to those of their clients created a structure in which plaintiffs' lawyers had both 
primary decisionmaking authority and the incentive to make litigation decisions in 
their own economic interests." 
Some lawyers went further in an effort to generate legal fees by developing 
securities fraud litigation. Witnesses before Congress testified to lawyers maintaining 
stables of named plaintiffs who were available for use as class representatives at 
counsel's behest."' Lawyers without a ready stock of plaintiffs obtained referrals 
through payments to brokerage firms. These plaintiffs received bonus payments for 
their participation but had little actual role in the subsequent cases and were often 
ignorant of the nature of the claims to which they lent their names. 
This then was the scenario described as lawyer-driven litigation to which 
Congress directed its efforts in the Reform Act. The Reform Act contained a wide 
range of statutory reforms that have been described in detail elsewhere," but that 
targeted the class action structure in particular. Concerned about lawyer-driven 
litigation, Congress sought to limit the class action lawyer's ability to generate 
litigation through the use of professional plaintiffs. Toward that end, Congress limited 
the number of lawsuits in which an individual could serve as class representative," 
and other deep pockets as defendants because of their assets and insurance coverage rather than 
because of their culpability). 
1 9 . According to the Conference Report, "discovery costs account for roughly 80% of 
the total litigation costs in securities fraud cases." !d. at Hl3701 (citations omitted). 
20. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 
7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 55, 57 (199 1 )  (describing settlement incentives created by 
indemnification and insurance structure); Bohn & Choi, supra note 1 6, at 920-2 1 (same). 
2 1 .  Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1 9  (stating that class members' stakes are often so 
small that the litigation is of virtually no importance to them). 
22. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class A ctions, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1 487, 1 534 ( 1 996) (describing process by which setting attorneys fee as 
percentage of recovery creates an incentive for lawyers to obtain a high hourly fee by seeking 
early settlement without conducting an adequate investigation). 
23. See, e.g. , Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 22-24 (describing economic incentives 
for plaintiffs' counsel). 
24. See, e.g., Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Pri vate Securities Lit igation 
Refonn A ct of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Act ion Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 10 1 1  ( 1 996) (describing use of "professional 
plaintiffs"). 
25.  See generally Seligman, supra note 9 (describing history and provisions of the 
Refonn Act). 
26. See Reform Act, supra note 3 (adding Sec. Act § 27(a)(3)(B)(vi); Sec. Ex Act § 
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banned referral fees to brokers," and prohibited class representatives from receiving 
special compensation." Congress further required any plaintiff seeking to serve as 
class representative to file a statement certifying that he or she has reviewed the 
complaint and authorized its filing and that he or she has not purchased stock for the 
purpose of participating in the litigation." 
In a further effort to transfer control of securities litigation away from lawyers 
and into the hands of class members, Congress adopted the lead plaintiff provision.'0 
The Reform Act requires the court to appoint a lead plaintiff to oversee the conduct of 
every securities fraud class action. The Act provides that the class member with the 
largest interest in the litigation is presumptively the most appropriate lead plaintiff" 
and contains provisions to encourage participation by institutional investors as lead 
plaintiffs. The lead plaintiff is given the authority to retain class counsel, subject to 
approval by the court. The Act also seeks to eliminate the traditional "race to the 
courthouse"32 through the lead plaintiff appointment process by requiring any plaintiff 
who files a securities fraud class action to provide notice of the action and of the 
opportunity for other shareholders to seek lead plaintiff status in a widely circulated 
business publication within twenty days of filing the complaint." Within ninety days 
of the published notice, the court must consider any motions seeking appointment as 
lead plaintiff and make the appointment." 
III. EvALUATING THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION 
A. The Potential of Institutional Activism 
The most comprehensive defense of the lead plaintiff provision is the one 
provided by its creators, Professors Weiss and Beckerman who, in a 1 995 Yale 
Law Journal Article, developed the model Congress adopted in the Reform Act." 
Weiss and Beckerman observed that institutional investors account for a large 
2 1D(a)(3)(B)(vi) (limiting individuals to serving as lead plaintiffs in no more than five 
securities class actions during a three-year period). 
27. !d. (adding Sec. Ex. Act§ 15(c)(8)). 
28. !d. (adding Sec. Act§ 27(a)(4); Sec. Ex. Act § 21D(a)(4)). 
29. !d. (adding Sec. Act§ 27(a)(2); Sec. Ex. Act§ 2 1 D(a)(2)). 
30. The lead plaintiff provision was adopted in response to a law review article proposal 
by Professors Weiss and Beckerman. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money 
Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions, 1 04 YALE L.J. 2053 ( 1 995) (proposing that investors with the largest stakes serve as 
lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions). 
31.  Reform Act, supra note 3 (adding Sec. Act § 27(a)(3); Sec. Ex. Act § 2 1 D(a)(3) ) .  
The presumption is rebuttable. See Greebel v .  FTP Software, Inc., 939 F.  Supp. 57 ,  59 (D. 
Mass. 1 996) (holding that presumption can only be rebutted by a member of the plaintiff class). 
32. Conference Report, supra note 4, at Hl3700 (stating that "the selection of the lead 
plaintiff and lead counsel should rest on considerations other than how quickly a plaintiff has 
filed its complaint"). 
3 3 .  Reform Act, supra note 3 (adding Sec. Act § 27(a)(3)(A)(i) ;  Sec. Ex. Act § 
2 1  D(3)(A)(i)). 
34. !d. (adding Sec. Act§ 27(a)(3)(B)(i ) ;  Sec. Ex. Act§ 21 D(3)(B)(i) ). 
35 .  See generally Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 30. 
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portion of the interests represented by class action lawyers and that their claimed 
losses are substantial.'• According to Weiss and Beckerman, these large stakes give 
institutional investors an incentive to monitor, but procedural impediments 
predating the Reform Act impeded institutional monitoring." These impediments 
included the race to the courthouse, that is, the court's general practice of awarding 
lead counsel status to the lawyer who files the first complaint, lack of notice that a 
case had been filed," and discovery relating to the class representative requirements 
of adequacy and typicality." 
As a solution, Weiss and Beckerman proposed the model adopted by the Reform 
Act, in which the procedures governing notice and the selection of lead plaintiff were 
designed to favor substantial shareholders, particularly institutional investors, rather 
than rewarding winners of the race to the courthouse.•o Under this system, institutions 
would receive information about proposed litigation and be in a position to monitor. 
Because the lead plaintiff selects class counsel, institutional investors would also be 
able to negotiate fee arrangements." Weiss and Beckerman speculated that the 
process of fee negotiation could be used to reduce agency costs and better tie 
litigation strategy to class member interests through greater innovations in fee 
structures than those traditionally employed by judicial fee awards." 
The ability of a law firm to file a complaint rapidly was a poor proxy for its 
competence. Judicial monitoring of the process was minimal however; the 
acquiescence of courts in the race to the courthouse reflected their unwillingness to 
determine which firm would provide the best representation at the lowest cost." The 
lead plaintiff provision thus replaces a process in which plaintiffs' counsel competed 
for the financial rewards of the class counsel position through means that impeded 
rational litigation choices with a system in which a sophisticated investor with a 
meaningful stake in the litigation and a strong negotiating position makes the 
selection. 
The lead plaintiff provision also vests oversight in a litigant with a substantial 
stake in the outcome, increasing the incentives to monitor the litigation and settlement 
processes.'' A large investor has a financial incentive to prevent plaintiffs' counsel 
from selling out legitimate claims too easily; early settlement of strong cases on poor 
36 .  !d. at 2088-94. 
37 .  !d. at 2095-21 04. 
3 8 .  See id. at 2062-63 (describing courts' general practice of appointing as lead counsel 
the lawyer who files the first complaint). 
39 .  !d. 
40. !d. at 2 1 05 .  
4 1 .  !d. at 2 1 07.  
42. !d. 
43 .  Commentators have suggested alternative methods of selecting lead counsel , and a 
few courts have experimented with alternatives. See id. at 2 1 07-1 0  (discussing and criticizing 
several such alternatives). 
44. See, e.g., Keith Johnson, Institutional Investor Part icipat ion in Class Actions After 
th e Private Sec urit ies L it igation Refonn Act of I 995, ALI-ABA, Nov. 7, 1996, at 379, 38 1 -82 
(describing the interest of the State of Wisconsin Investment Board in securities fraud class 
action litigation as amounting to as much as 20% of the total damage claim and resulting in 
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terms will not adequately compensate the lead plaintiff for its losses.'' Institutional 
investors may also have greater sophistication and resources to devote to the 
monitoring effort and more familiarity with the legal and factual issues in securities 
fraud litigation, making them effective as well as motivated monitors. The legislative 
preference for increased institutional investor involvement in securities litigation, 
because of these attributes, is thus consistent with calls for greater institutional 
investor activism generally in corporate governance.'' 
Substantial shareholders may also have litigation incentives that reflect general 
social welfare. To the extent that much securities litigation results merely in a shift of· 
assets from one shareholder class to another,'' substantial shareholders who are 
broadly diversified will rationally reject such cases as producing no social gain." 
Weak cases that burden business through the imposition of litigation costs will 
similarly appear undesirable to institutions which benefit from a litigation structure 
that minimizes the burden on legitimate business activity. At the same time, 
substantial shareholders are likely to appreciate the deterrence value of securities 
fraud litigation as well as its capacity to generate a monetary recovery in a particular 
case and may resist settlements that do not impose adequate accountability on 
wrongdoers." Thus the lead plaintiff provision offers the possibility of decreasing the 
control of plaintiffs' counsel over the l itigation process and reducing the problems of 
too much litigation of weak cases and poor settlements in strong cases. 
Early experience demonstrates that institutional activism has the potential to alter 
the decisionrnaking process in securities fraud class actions. Even before the adoption 
of the Reform Act, institutional investors had made some attempts to exercise greater 
control over securities litigation, attempts that justify Congress' faith in their 
participation as lead plaintiffs. In litigation over the disclosure of defects in the Intel 
pentium chip, for example, a group of institutional investors collectively investigated 
the securities fraud claims and determined that they were without merit.'0 The group 
45. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 30, at 2 1 2 1  (suggesting that "largest benefit" of 
institutional monitoring of class actions is likely to be more favorable settlement terms for 
plaintiff class). 
46. See, e. g. ,  Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1009 n.3 ( 1 994) (citing articles calling for greater institutional activism as means 
of improving corporate governance). 
47. See, e. g. , Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities 
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 1 1 ,  635 ( 1 985) (describing how securities violations redistribute 
wealth among investors but arguably produce a net social gain of zero). 
48. See Benjamin M. Vandergrift, The Class Action Provisions of the Private Securities 
Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1996, at 4 (arguing that much securities fraud 
litigation had turned into a vehicle for redistributing wealth from institutional investors to short 
term investors). 
49. See In re California Micro Devices Sec. Litig., 168 F.R.D. 257, 272 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (observing that rational institutional investors will only pursue cases that "generate a 
genuine deterrent effect" and rejecting proposed settlement in light of objections by 
institutional investors that the settlement Jacked such a deterrent effect). 
50. See Joseph A. Grundfest et al., The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective 
Institutional Activism in Litigation, 38 A.�IZ. L. REV. 559 ( 1 996) (describing informal 
participation by Institutional Investors' Forum in iitigation over the pentium chip). 
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then drafted a detailed letter to plaintiffs' counsel asking that the suit be dismissed." 
Although plaintiffs' counsel had voluntarily dismissed the case prior to learning of the 
letter,'2 the process demonstrated both the institutions' ability to identify a claim 
meriting dismissal and their willingness to become involved in achieving that result. 
In the same vein, the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association 
("ColPERA") objected to a settlement in In re California Micro Devices Securities 
Litigation" as undervaluing the defendant' s cash resources. Upon learning of 
ColPERA's objection, Judge Walker refused to approve the settlement and to certify 
the putative class representatives, finding that they had failed to monitor class counsel 
adequately. Instead, Judge Walker appointed ColPERA as class representative.'' In 
choosing an institutional investor as class representative, Judge Walker articulated the 
same confidence as that expressed by Congress in the Reform Act. 
Institutional investors have financial interests in the outcome of 
securities class actions which dwarf the interests of individual 
plaintiffs, and with this increased financial interest comes an 
increased incentive to monitor class counsel' s conduct of the action. 
Institutional investors, moreover, are much better situated to 
conduct such monitoring, both because they have greater resources 
and because, as repeat players in securities class actions, they are 
experienced in the issues which these actions inevitably raise." 
Following ColPERA' s appointment as class representative, the settlement was 
favorably renegotiated." 
In a related context, the California Public Employees' Retirement System 
("CalPERS") recently sought and obtained permission to intervene in a state 
derivative suit." CalPERS, which owned 1.3 million shares, had retained its own 
counsel to monitor the proceedings in Weiser v. Grace," a case involving allegations 
of breaches of fiduciary duty by the directors of W .R. Grace. When plaintiffs' counsel 
proposed to settle the case on terms that did not involve any monetary payment to the 
company, CalPERS objected to the settlement." In addition to permitting CalPERS to 
intervene, the court appointed CalPERS' counsel to serve as co-lead counsel for the 
51. See id. at 608-26 (containing a copy of the letter as Exhibit A). 
52. ld. at 595. 
53. 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
54. Judge Walker later appointed the California State Teachers' Retirement System as a11 
additional class representative. !d. at 277. 
55. !d. at 275. 
56. Johnson, supra note 44, at 384. Because the renegotiated settlement involves a 
greater proportion of cash, and because of fluctuations in the value of the stock portion of the 
settlement, there is currently some debate before the court regarding whether the new 
settlement is more favorable to class members. 
57. See Jay B. Kasner & Scott D. Musoff, Institutional investor Intervenes in Derivative 
Suit, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1996, at 5 (describing progress of the litigation and CalPERS' 
successful effort to intervene). 
58. N.Y.L.J., Sept. 12, 1996, at 22 (Sup. 0. N.Y. Co. Sept. 12, 1996). 
59. Kasner & !Vlusoff, supra note 57. 
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plaintiffs, thereby allowing CaiPERS full participation in the settlement negotiations.60 
The first widely reported effort by an institutional investor to gain lead plaintiff 
status under the Reform Act was also successful. In Gluck v. CellStar," the 
experienced plaintiffs' firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach filed a class 
action suit on behalf of individual investors. After plaintiffs complied with the notice 
requirements of the new statute, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board filed a 
request for appointment as lead plaintiff. In an October 1 st ruling, the court granted 
that request over Milberg Weiss' objection. Significantly, the court denied Milberg 
Weiss' request that the court designate its plaintiff group and SWIB as co-lead 
plaintiffs, rejecting the invitation to institute litigation management by committee . ., 
SWIB considered a proposal from Milberg Weiss to serve as lead counsel as 
well as proposals from several other firms. The proposals included descriptions of 
anticipated litigation plans and fee schedules. Subsequently, SWIB selected its 
lawyers, the Philadelphia firm of Blank, Rome, Cornish.)' & McCauley, as lead 
counsel." The agreed fee arrangement provided for counsel to receive a sliding scale 
percentage of the recovery, with the percentage increasing both with the size of the 
recovery and the progress of the matter through various stages of litigation."' This 
structure, unlike traditional judicial fee awards, was designed to give plaintiffs' 
counsel an incentive to pursue a sizeable recovery even if that recovery required 
additional litigation effort. The fee structure thus aligned the interests of the law firm 
more closely with those of SWIB, its client. 
B. The Possible Dark Side of Institutional Activism 
Institutional activism enjoys broad support. Many commentators believe 
institutional investors are well situated to improve monitoring and reduce agency 
costs through greater participation in corporate governance." Institutional 
participation in securities fraud litigation, through the lead plaintiff provision, offers a 
classic exa;-nple of institutional activism as a means to reduce agency probl ems. Yet 
there are reasons to question both the willingness of institutional investors to 
participate and the value of their participation. In evaluating the lead plaintiff 
provision, it is important to consider the possible dark side of institutional activism in 
60. !d. This was not the first case in which Ca!PERS had intervened in an. effort to 
oppose the settlement of a derivative suit. In Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991), for 
example, CalPERS intervened and opposed the settlement of a suit challenging a decision of 
Occidental Petroleum's Board of Directors to make a charitable donation to construct a 
museum to house the Anna.ild Hammer Art Collection. The court in Kahn approved the 
settlement over Ca!PERS' objections. !d. at 58 (describing lower court's approval of 
settlement); id. at 63 (finding lower court's approval of settlement did not constitute an abuse 
of discretion). 
61. Civil Action No. 3:96 CV-1353-R (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 1 996). 
62. See Edward Brodsky, Institutional Investors: Typical of the Class?, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 
1996, at 3 (describing Gluck decision). 
63. See Johnson , supra note 4-4, at 386--87 (describing SVI1B's process of selecting 
BlanJ<, Rome to serve as lead counsel). 
64. ld. (describing fee 81T3.\lgemenl!. 
65. See, e.g., Weiss & Beckem1an, supra note 30, at 2056. 
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addition to its merits ... 
1. The Risk of Passivity 
One pending question about the power of the lead plaintiff provision is the extent 
to which institutional investors will participate under the Reform Act as lead 
plaintiffs." Weiss and Beckerman themselves recognized that institutions may be 
wary of the costs and burdens associated with lead plaintiff status." In addition to 
institutional fear of liability associated with lead plaintiff status-a fear which the 
Conference Report attempted to dissipate with a statement that the lead plaintiff 
provision does not create any new fiduciary duty on the part of institutional 
investors"-lead plaintiffs have reason to fear the practical burdens of activism. Lead 
plaintiff participation requires institutions to bear costs such as investigating a 
securities fraud claim, reviewing a complaint, submitting to discovery, selecting lead 
counsel, and monitoring the litigation and settlement process.'0 These costs create free 
rider problems, because institutions, particularly those concerned about minimizing 
administrative costs generally, are rationally apt to prefer that another investor take 
the initiative to become involved.'1 
Institutions may also fear that the benefits of greater activism will be outweighed 
by adverse consequences.72 Active participation in litigation may provide an 
institution with inside information that limits its ability to trade in the stock that is the 
subject of the litigation." Institutions may sacrifice their relationships with issuers by 
litigating securities fraud claims, reducing the superior access and influence that some 
institutional investors have come to enjoy." Some institutional investors may also be 
66. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, IS 
CARDozo L. REV. 987 ( 1 994) (raising concerns about possible adverse consequences of 
institutional activism). 
67. See Dominic Bencivenga, Litigation Re-Fonned: Lawyers Report on 'Year 1' Under 
Securities Act, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 1 6, 1 997, at 5 (observing that "large investors and institutional 
investors have not been stepping forward in significant numbers to become the most adequate 
plaintiff'). 
68. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 30, at 2 1 09-10. 
69. Conference Report, supra note 4, at H13700 (stating that "the most adequate 
plaintiff provision does not confer any new fiduciary duty on institutional investors and the 
courts should not impose such a duty"). 
70. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 44, at 386-87 (describing uncertain costs and risks 
associated with institutional participation as lead plaintiffs). 
7 1 .  See, e.g. , Fisch, supra note 46, at 1020-23 (describing how free rider problems 
create particular disincentives for activism among institutions for which performance is judged 
relative to the performance of their peers). 
72. See Bencivenga, supra note 67 (quoting defense attorney Bruce G. Vanyo as 
attributing lack of institutional participation to the fact that lead plaintiff status offers "too 
much risk and too little to gain"). 
73. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 44, at 5 (questioning whether institution serving as 
lead plaintiff will be precluded from tmding in the compa.I1y's stock during the course of the 
litigation). 
74. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemrr112 of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1352 n.25 (1995) (predicting that most institutions will prefer to avoid 
active participation in class actions in order to preserve their relationships with corporate 
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subject to political pressure or other constraints on their freedom to make l itigation 
decisions. 
If institutions do not affirmatively decide to participate, despite the Reform Act's  
invitation, securities litigation may proceed in substantially the same manner as 
before. Although post-Reform Act litigation demonstrates some effort by institutions 
to become involved in securities fraud litigation, individuals rather than institutions 
have secured lead plaintiff status in most cases to date. Indeed, plaintiffs appear to be 
responding to Congress '  direction that the appropriate lead plaintiff is the plaintiff 
with the largest stake by forming groups of individuals to serve as co-lead plaintiffs . 
Recent examples include Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd., in which a group of 
ten individual plaintiffs was appointed;75 In re Health Management Inc. Securities 
Litigation, in which eleven individual plaintiffs were appointed co-lead counsel;" and 
In re Vista 2000, Inc. Securities Litigation, in which thirteen individual plaintiffs were 
appointed." The plaintiffs, and more importantly the plaintiffs' counsel, responsible 
for initially filing the complaints, frequently retain their role in the litigation despite 
the lead plaintiff provisions. Thus, for example, in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc . ," 
the plaintiffs filing the complaint were appointed as lead plaintiffs and their lawyers, 
the firm of Milberg Weiss, were appointed class counsel, a result mirroring the 
standard practice pre-dating the adoption of the Reform Act. 
Similarly, it appears that lead counsel positions are being secured, in most cases, 
by the traditional plaintiffs' securities firms. Milberg Weiss, the leader in pre-Reform 
Act filings," has already secured a number of lead counsel appointments, including 
appointment as sole lead counsel in Greebef•o and Tower Semiconductor' and as co­
lead counsel in Vista 2000" and Wellcare." Simi l arly, the three firms jointly 
appointed class counsel in In re Cephalon Securities Litigation" were all traditional 
plaintiffs ' securities firms." Even where institutional investors are among lhe lead 
management and the superior access to information resulting from those relationships). 
75. Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd.,  Civil Action No. 2:96cv037 1 1  (J'NB) (D.N.J. 
Nov. 8 ,  1 996).  
76.  In re Health Management Inc. Sec. Litig. , No. 96-CV-889 (ADS) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
7. 1 996). 
77.  In re Vista 2000, 1nc. Sec. Liti g . ,  Civil Action No. 1 :96-CV-906-Fi\1H (N.D. Ga. 
July 9, 1 996). 
78. 939 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1 996). 
79. Milberg Weiss, the leader among plaintiffs' lawyers, was responsible for filing 1 93 
cases between 1 988 and mid- 1 995.  Nancy Rutter, Bill Lerach Thinks of Himself as Robin 
Hood in a Class Action Suit, FORBES, Oct. 9 ,  1 995,  at 1 1 6. 
80. See Greebel v .  FrP Software, Inc . ,  939 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1 996) (appointing 
Milberg Weiss firm as lead counsel ) .  
8 1 .  Weikel v. Tower Semiconductor Ltd. ,  Civil Action No. 2 :96cv037 1 1  (JWB) (D.NJ.  
Nov. 8, 1 996). 
82.  In r e  Vista 2000, Inc. Sec. Litig. , Civil Action No. 1 :96-CV-906-FMH (N.D. Ga.  
July 9 ,  1 996). 
8 3 .  !n re The Well care )\;Ianagement Group, Inc. Sec. Litig . ,  96-CV -052 l (TJ!vl/DRH) 
(N.D.N.Y.  July 3, 1 996).  
84. 1 996 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 1 3492 (E. D.  Pa. Aug. 27, 1 996). 
85. See Bohn & Choi, supm note 1 6, at 909 n.27 (listing major traditional plaintiffs' 
firms). 
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plaintiffs, traditional plaintiffs' firms are obtaining lead counsel appointments.•• 
The structure of the lead plaintiff provision requires institutions to act 
affmnatively to change the existing litigation procedure." In the absence of an 
institution's motion to participate, the first filer and his or her law firm will continue 
to control the litigation. This scenario was exemplified in Greebel, in which the court 
concluded that the statutory language of the Reform Act limits the right to challenge 
the qualifications of the lead plaintiff and to conduct discovery on that issue to other 
members of the plaintiff class." Over the objection of the defendant, the Greebel court 
therefore appointed as lead plaintiffs the plaintiffs who had filed the initial 
complaint." The court' s holding was constrained by a statutory structure that leaves 
the decision to seek appointment in the hands of the large shareholder. Because no 
other class members had sought appointment as lead plaintiff, the shareholders who 
filed the complaint perforce had the largest financial interest and were otherwise most 
appropriate . .., 
If, because of their generally small stakes, class members are rationally apathetic 
on the issue of who serves as lead plaintiff, many cases are likely to be litigated along 
the lines of the Greebel model, in which no substantial shareholder attempts to 
interfere with the appointment of the initial filer and his or her counsel. Moreover, 
institutions that do not seek lead plaintiff status themselves have little reason to object 
to such an appointment. In terms of the expected effect on the institution's welfare, 
the appointment of lead plaintiff is far less significant than the terms of settlement, yet 
pre-Reform Act cases demonstrated relatively little involvement by institutions even 
at the settlement stage. California Micro Devices was the exception, not the norm. 
2. The Risk of Activism 
The risk of institutional passivity should not be overstated. Although the lead 
plaintiff proposal has been criticized as offering institutional investors insufficient 
incentive to incur the costs associated with taking a more active role in securities 
litigation, the apparent willingness of institutional investors to become involved even 
without express legislative support offers the possibility that some institutions will 
accept Congress' invitation. Given the degree of institutional investment in the stock 
market, a relatively small percentage of institutional involvement could change the 
control structure in securities fraud litigation. 
The wisdom of inviting institutional involvement is another matter. First, the 
adoption of the lead plaintiff provision creates some tension between its procedures 
and the pre-existing requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23." If 
86.  See, e. g.,  Malin v. IV AX Corp., Case No. 96- 1 843-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
3 I ,  1 996) (appointing group including Pennsylvania Pension Fund as co-lead plaintiffs and 
approving group's selection of two traditional plaintiffs' firms as lead counsel). 
87. Cf Alexander, supra note 2 2  (proposing regulatory refonn that requires institutions 
to take an active role in  securities litigation i n  order to participate in the class action) .  
88 .  Greebel v. FfP Software, Inc. ,  939 F. Supp.  57 (D. fvfass. 1 996). 
89 .  !d. 
90. !d. 
9 1 .  See generaliy Vincent R. Cappucci , Corq?icts Between Ruie 23 and Securities 
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institutions decide to participate actively, their participation may threaten the process 
by which Rule 23 protects the interests of all class members.92 The text of the Reform 
Act does not address the manner in which this tension is to be reconciled. Second, 
and more importantly, there are reasons to question the ability of institutional 
involvement to address the general goal of the Reform Act: the concerns associated 
with lawyer-driven litigation. 
Initially, participation by institutions as lead plaintiffs must be consistent with the 
protection that Rule 23 and due process provide for absent class members through the 
use of the class representative." To insure that the interests of class members are 
treated fairly, Rule 23 requires the court to identify a class representative.'' The court 
must determine that the class representative fairly and adequately represents the 
interests of the class, that the class representative's claims are typical of those of the 
class, and that the class representative is not subject to unique or personal defenses. 
Institutional investors may not meet these criteria.9l 
Weiss and Beckerman's article and Congress' response applaud the value of 
institutional investors as lead plaintiffs precisely because they are atypical in terms of 
their larger stake, greater sophistication and better access to information." These 
qualities may be held against them, however, as defendants challenge their reliance on 
public disclosures or assert a failure to exercise due diligence!' Moreover some 
institutions like CalPERS enjoy a degree of informal access to corporate management 
not shared by individual investors." Some courts have found that these qualities may 
subject a sophisticated investor to unique defenses in securities fraud litigation ... ' An 
investor who faces the prospect of the sophisticated investor defense may not meet 
the typicality requirement of Rule 23. ""' Similarly, an institution may have traded in 
Rejom1 Act, N.Y.L.J. ,  Apr. 2, 1 996, at 1 (describing potential i nconsistencies between 
requirements of Rule 23 and participation of institutional investors as lead plai ntiffs). 
92. See Elizabeth S. Strong, Reforn� A ct 's 'Most Adequate Plaintiff' Conflicts with 
Federal Rules, N.Y.L.J . ,  June 20, 1 996, at 1 .  
9 3 .  See Daniel R. Waltcher, Classwide A rbitration and lOb-5 Claims in the Wake of 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 380,  399 n . 1 20 ( 1 989) 
(describing requirement of Rule 23 and due process that class representative adequately 
represent absent class members). 
94. See, e.g.,  In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig. , 
55 F.3d 768, 796 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 6 S. Ct. 88 ( 1 995) ('The Rule 23 (a) class inquiries 
(numerosity, cornmonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation) constitute a multipart 
attempt to safeguard the due process rights of absentees."). 
95. See Brodsky, supra note 62 (describing plaintiffs' arguments in Gluck v. CellStar 
that SWlB did not meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23). 
96. See, e.g. , Edward B rodsky, Institutional Investors: The 'Most Adequate ' Plaintiffs, 
N.Y.L.J. , July 1 0, 1 996, at 3 .  
9 7 .  The plaintiff group challenging SWIB ' s  effort to b e  appointed lead plai ntiff argued 
that S\VJB was atypical because it was a sophisticated investor a11d because it used in vestment 
methods that were not typical of smaller investors in the plaintiff class. Johnson, supra note 44, 
at 388 .  
98 .  See, e.g.,  Judith H. Dobrzynski , Small Companies, Big Problems, N.Y.  TIMES, Feb. 
6, 1 996, at D l  (describing CalPERS'  superior access to corporate boards). 
99 .  See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 72-73 (describing judiciai acceptance of 
sophisticated investor defense); Cappucci, supra note 93 (same). 
1 00. See, e.g . . Zandman v.  Joseph, 1 02 F.R.D. 924, 932 (N.D. Ind. 1 9 84) (finding that 
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and out of the relevant stock throughout the class period. This trading is, of course, 
relevant to the extent of the institution's damage claims, but it is also relevant to 
issues such as the manner in which the class is defined and the institution's reliance. ' 0' 
The litigation objectives of institutional investors may also differ from those of 
the individual investors in the class. '02 Obviously an institution that continues to own 
stock is poorly suited to represent investors who are no longer invested in the 
company. '0' Most institutions hold a broad share of the market in a diversified 
portfolio. Securities litigation that transfers money from present stockholders to past 
stockholders is of little value to these investors.  Elimination of this type of litigation, 
however, may prejudice individual investors."" Similarly, an institution may have 
diversified away the risks associated with being on the losing end of a securities 
fraud, and recognizing that over time, it is likely to gain an equal amount from being 
an innocent beneficiary of improper disclosure, it may be unwilling to incur the costs 
associated with litigating the redistribution of damage claims within its own pocket. 
Although rational from the institution's perspective, that litigation posture need not 
produce the optimal level of securities enforcement from the perspective of all 
investors. 
Given that Congress chose the lead plaintiff provision instead of alternatives such 
as a requirement that filing plaintiffs own a designated minimum quantity of stock, it 
is reasonable to infer that Congress intended institutions to represent the interests of 
small as well as large shareholders. A statutory provision imposing a minimum 
shareholding requirement would achieve Congress ' objective of insuring that claims 
were filed by those plaintiffs with a substantial financial stake in the litigation. '0' A 
minimum shareholding requirement was objectionable, however, on the grounds that 
investor who i nvested $3 million in defendant corporation' s  stock and had substantial contacts 
with officers of the company and financial analysis failed to meet typicality requirement); 
Grace v.  Perception Tech. Corp. ,  1 28 F.R.D. 1 65,  1 69 (D. Mass. 1 989) (holding that "contact 
with corporate officers and special meetings at the company will render a plaintiff atypical to 
represent the class") . 
1 0 1 .  See, e.g., Fleming Co. Inc. Litig., Nos. 96-CV-869, 96-CV-85 3 ,  96--CV-830 
(W. D. Okla. filed April 4, 1 996) (first-fi ling plaintiffs claiming that causation defense renders 
an institutional investor unsuitable as class representative) ; J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American 
Appraisal Assocs. ,  Inc., 628 F.2d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 1 980) (finding institutional investor' s 
sophistication might prevent it from establishing reliance and that the presence of this potential 
defense destroys its typicality). 
1 02. See Vandergrift, supra note 48 (suggesting that public or political pressure faced by 
some institutional investors may make them less willing to settle litigation). 
1 03 .  'TI1e interests of continuing shareholders will conflict with those of class members 
who have sold on the issue of whether to seek a large compensatory damage award. See 
Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 505 (arguing that pursuing meritorious l itigation may not be in 
the best interests of continuing shareholders). 
1 04. See, e. g., id. at 1 504 (observing that, because institutions are diversified and frequ'=nt 
investors, they may prefer deterrence to compensation as a litigation obj ective). 
1 05 .  See S .  240, i 04th Cong. ,  1 st Sess. ,  § 1 0 1  ( 1 995);  H.R. 1 0, 1 04th Cong. ,  1 st Sess . ,  § 
203 ( 1 995) (proposing requirement that named plaintiffs hold lT'jnimum of either one percent 
or ten thousand dollars in m;:u·ket value of the subj ect securities) ;  cf Mary E. M atthews, 
Deriva:'ive Suits and the Similarly Situated Shareholder Requirement, 8 DEPAUL B us.  L.J. 1 ,  
37 ( 1 995) (discussing minimum shareholding requirement as a means of addressing concem of 
frivolous de;ivative litigation). 
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it would eliminate the small shareholders' recourse to the courts, rendering small 
shareholders dependent on a large shareholder's  decision to pursue litigation. 
This observation suggests a weakness in the lead plaintiff provision. To the 
extent that the Reform Act allows small shareholders to file suit but permits 
institutional investors to take control of the litigation away from the filing plaintiff, it 
preserves for the small investor only the opportunity to incur the costs associated with 
drafting and filing a complaint and eliminates meaningful access to the judicial 
system. The anticipation that individual plaintiffs and their lawyers may lose control 
of filed cases through the appointment of others as lead plaintiffs also diminishes the 
incentive for smaller investors to investigate instances of fraud and initiate legal 
action. '06 To the extent that one value of private litigation is to supplement public 
enforcement efforts in an area in which detection of wrongdoing is difficult, the 
potential reduction in investigation effort imposes a public cost on market integrity. 
Concerns about typicality and the ability of institutions to represent small 
investors could be partially mitigated through the use of co-lead plaintiff 
appointments. Courts have appointed multiple class representatives in pre-Reform 
Act cases and, as indicated above, a number of courts have appointed groups of 
investors as co-lead plaintiffs under the Reform Act.'0' If co-lead plaintiff 
appointments reflect the diversity that exists within the plaintiff class, they permit the 
lead plaintiff to represent a broader range of investor interests as well as reducing the 
potential for opportunistic self-dealing by the lead plaintiff. 
The downside of appointing multiple litigants to serve as co-lead plaintiffs is 
frustration of the Reform Act's effort to increase the efficiency of the litigation 
process and to reduce agency costs. Indeed, prior reform proposals such as the 
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act would, through the use of plaintiff steering 
committees, have implemented an approach analogous to the use of multiple co-lead 
plaintiffs. '0' The proposed steering committees had the drawback of generating 
administrative costs that threatened to overwhelm any additional value created 
through the committee' s  oversight.",. The perception that multiple co-lead plaintiffs 
would render the administration of class actions unwieldy may have influenced the 
Gluck court' s decision to deny the filing plaintiff s request to share co-lead plaintiff 
1 06.  See, e.g. , John Burritt McArthur, The Strange Case of American Civil Procedure 
and the Missing Unifonn Discovery Time Limits, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 865,  969 n.302 ( 1 996) 
(describing how counsel filing an initial complaint is now "at risk" unless it can persuade the 
holder of the l argest interest to retain it); Karen Donovan, New Securities Law May Squeeze 
Out Milberg Weiss, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1 2, 1 996, at A7 (describing how Milberg Weiss spent 
"tens of thousands of dollars" to investigate in Gluck v. CellS tar Corp. , only to be replaced as 
plaintiffs' counsel). 
1 07 . See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
1 08 .  H.R. 1 058, 1 04th Cong., 1 st Sess. § 2 ( 1 995) (proposing steering committees of at 
least five members which would have primary responsibility for directing counsel on behalf of 
the cl ass as  well as reviewing offers of settlement). 
1 09.  See, e.g. ,  Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 399, 965-66 ( 1 996) (describing holdout problem and other failures created by the 
steeling committee' s  negotiations in the federal asbestos litigation and explaining that a 
broadly representative steering comrrilttee will encounter difficulty in satisfying all its 
constit,Jents). 
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status with SWIB.110 Among other things, joint appointment could create conflicts 
over the choice of class counsel. Alternatively, if courts follow the pattern emerging 
from cases like IVAX,11 '  Medaphis,1 12 and Vista 2000, '"  and appoint multiple lead 
counsel as well multiple lead plaintiffs, such appointments could further multiply the 
already substantial legal fees associated with class actions.' "  
A still darker side of institutional participation in  securities litigation is  the 
potential for collusion. To the extent that institutions exercise control of litigation 
decisions, their control need not be exercised for the general benefit of the 
shareholder class but could instead be used for the creation and appropriation of 
private gains. Other commentators and I have identified the ability of institutions to 
use their bargaining power to obtain private gains as a general risk of institutional 
activism.'" This risk is similarly present in securities litigation. Institutions may seek 
to obtain favorable investment opportunities, better access to corporate information, 
or influence over corporate governance decisions, in exchange for cooperation in 
addressing the concerns of securities fraud defendants. These exchanges can result in 
institutions exercising their decisionmaking authority in ways that are inconsistent 
with the needs of the shareholder class. 
The risk of collusion is enhanced by the fact that institutions have traditionally 
maintained the ability to act through informal contacts with issuers in ways not 
subject to public view. The Reform Act operates to reduce this prospect by mandating 
increased disclosure of settlement terms. Section 101  of the Act requires settlement 
notices to include an explanation of the reasons for the settlement, the amount sought 
in attorneys fees, and a statement from each settling party describing the amount of 
recoverable damages.'"  The extent to which this disclosure will limit collusive 
settlement is unclear, however. As some commentators have observed, courts have 
evidenced limited ability to scrutinize inadequate or collusive settlements , ' "  and there 
is little reason to believe that disclosure under the Reform Act will substantially 
increase judicial monitoring of settlements."' Indeed, the adoption of the lead plaintiff 
1 1 0.  See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis ,  Business Watch, NAT'L L.J . ,  Oct. 28, 
1 996 at B5 (claiming that "management by committee" would also reduce the attraction of the 
lead plaintiff role for many institutional i nvestors). 
1 1 1 . Malin v.  IV.AJ( Corp.,  Case No. 96-1 843-CIV-MORENO (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3 1 ,  1 996) 
(appointing two firms as co-lead counsel). 
1 1 2. ln re 1 996 Medaphis Corp. Sec. Litig.,  Civil Action No. 1 :96-CV-2088-FMH 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 23 , 1 996) (appointing three separate firms as co-lead counsel with an additional 
firm designated plaintiffs' liaison counsel). 
1 1 3 .  In re Vista 2000, Inc. Sec. Litig. ,  Civil Action No. 1 :96-CY-906-FMH (N.D. Ga. 
July 9, 1 996) (appointing three firms as co-lead counsel and an additional firm as plaintiffs' 
liaison counsel). 
1 1 4.  See Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 532 (observing that appointment of multiple lead 
counsel can lead to performance of duplicative or unnecessary legal work in an effort to justify 
fee awards). 
1 1 5 .  See, e. g . ,  Rock, supra note 66; Fisch, supra note 46. 
1 1 6 .  Reform Act, supra note 3 (adding Sec. Act § 27(a)(3)(B)(7); Sec. Ex. Act § 
2 1 D(a)(3 )(B)(7) ) .  
1 1 7 .  See, e.g.,  Macey & Miller, supra note 8 ,  at 45-46 (describing judici al approval of 
settlements as a "highly imperfect" means of protecting plaintiffs ' interests). 
1 1 8 .  i',Jote, Investor Empowerment Strategies in the Congressional Reform of Securities 
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provision is arguably a recogmt10n of the ineffectiveness of judicial monitoring. 
Moreover, litigants retain ample opportunities through the discovery process to 
control the record upon which settlement review is based. This enables litigants to 
convince a reviewing court that the settlement terms are reasonable. 
The lead plaintiffs control over the selection of class counsel may also create an 
opportunity for collusion. The Reform Act provides that lead plaintiffs will be 
responsible for the choice of class counsel, subject to approval by the court. The Act 
provides no standards for judicial review, and the circumstances under which courts 
should defer to the lead plaintiffs choice are therefore unclear. Historically, courts in 
most cases have been unwilling or unable carefuliy to scrutinize the qualifications of 
class counsel. Indeed, judicial reluctance to impose meaningful selection criteria 
directly contributed to the "race to the courthouse" scenario, by placing a premium on 
being first to file rather than rewarding the counsel that files the best complaint or 
offers the most cost-effective litigation strategy.' 19 The Reform Act offers little 
indication as to why institutional investors are better equipped than courts to select 
lead counsel, and even less guidance as to the manner in which courts can effectively 
review lead counsel 's decision. 
On the one hand, it is unclear that institutions will exercise this selection power 
differently than traditional plaintiffs. The existing plaintiffs' bar in securities fraud 
litigation is highly specialized. A small number of firms are responsible for the filing 
of most cases,"o and most other firms have little experience litigating securities 
claims, at least on the plaintiffs' side. If institutions choose among the traditional 
plaintiffs ' counsel, as initial practice under the Reform Act suggests most are doing, 
substituting institutions for individual class representatives may have limited impact 
on the conduct of securities fraud litigation. Indeed, the choice of a traditional 
plaintiffs' firm may signal an acceptance of the finn' s  expertise and litigation strategy 
as appropriate. 
If, on the other hand, institutions choose other lawyers, their choice may be 
criticized for sacrificing the developed expertise of existing plaintiffs '  firms. Among 
Milberg Weiss' objections to SWIB' s  selection of Blank Rome in Gluck v. CellStar 
was the argument that Blank Rome had no experience representing securities fraud 
plaintiffs. '" The Reform Act offers courts no guidance for weighing this argument or 
for evaluating the qualifications of the chosen firm. Nor does the Act indicate whether 
it is appropriate for institutions to prefer law firms with which they have ongoing 
Class Actions, 1 09 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2064 ( 1 996) (expressing skepticism about capacity of 
judicial monitoring to prevent collusive settlements). 
1 1 9. Cf In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 1 3 1  F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1 990) (refusing to select class 
counsel based on first to file and implementing competitive bidding process instead); Nannette 
L. Stasko, Comment, Competitive Bidding in the Courthouse: In re Oracle Securities 
Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1 667 ( 1 994) (describing competitive bidding process used in 
Oracle Securities). 
1 20. See Rutter, supra note 79 (describing majority of filings as made by top five 
plaintiffs' firms). 
1 2 1 .  Miiberg Weiss argued that Blank Rome had a defense-based practice. Dennis J.  
B lock & Jonathan M. Hoff, Securities Litigation Refonn: One Year Retrospective, N .Y .L.J . , 
Jai1. l6 ,  1 997, at 5 .  
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business relationships to the exclusion of firms more experienced in securities 
litigation. 
The Reform Act creates an incentive for lawyers seeking the lucrative class 
counsel appointment to develop relationships with institutional investors. Pre-Reform 
Act litigation was criticized for allowing lawyers to recruit class action plaintiffs 
rather than the other way around. Institutional investors, however, are readily 
identifiable as potential lead plaintiffs; it is rational for existing plaintiffs' firms to 
cultivate institutions as clients. The Act thus offers the opportunity to create a 
lucrative new position, that of class action counsel for an institution such as CalPERS, 
a position that offers a lawyer more secure access to the counsel fees associated with 
securities fraud litigation than the pre-Act litigation structure. By creating these 
incentives, the Reform Act may alter the litigation of securities class actions, but it 
need not lessen the degree to which they are controlled by lawyer rather than client.122 
Institutions may also utilize their increased power to select class counsel by 
extracting private gains in exchange for lead counsel appointments."' These gains 
might involve favorable treatment in the subject litigation or instead involve unrelated 
legal services. Although the Reform Act bars lead plaintiffs from receiving bonuses 
or preferential treatment in a settlement, courts are likely to have difficulty 
discovering if a lawyer has, for example, agreed to provide unrelated legal services to 
an institutional investor at below market rates in exchange for selection as class 
counsel. 
Whether institutional investors will exercise their new power under the Reform 
Act to control securities litigation remains unclear. Even more uncertain is the extent 
to which Congress'  decision to vest this power in the hands of institutional investors 
has created a new opportunity for exploitation of small investors. What is perhaps 
most unclear, however, is the extent to which the procedural reforms of the Act, 
including the lead plaintiff provision, will transfer control of securities class actions 
from lawyer to client. 
IV. PROCEDURAL REFORM BEYOND SECURITIES 
LITIGATION 
Outside the securities area, critics have offered many proposals for general 
class action reform,'2' some of which have been discussed in this symposium."' 
1 22. Nor will the procedural changes adopted by the Reform Act prevent this process. 
Although elimination of bonuses and broker-referral fees reduces the ability of lawyers to 
recruit individual plaintiffs, these reforms are not meaningful checks against collusion between 
plaintiffs firms and institutional investors. Firms do not need brokers, for example, to refer 
them to institutional putative lead plaintiffs; the investment holdings of many institutional 
investors are in  the public domain. 
1 23 .  See Fisch, supra note 46, at 1 03 8-47 (discussing potential for institutional i nvestors 
to use their influence to generate private gains). 
1 24. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23,  Class 
Actions, reprinted in 1 67 F.R.D. 559 ( 1 996) (hereinafter Proposed Rules); see also Edward H. 
Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 7 1  N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 3 , 32-35 ( 1 996) 
(describing original proposals by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to amend Rule 23) ;  
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Analyzing reform proposals is complicated by the fact that the class action 
structure is used in a range of situations. As the experience with securities l itigation 
reform demonstrates, a particular substantive area may have characteristics that 
generate special opportunities for abuse or, alternatively , create unique 
opportunities for experimentation and reform.1" A more general problem is that 
class actions divide into two distinct economic models :  "smail claimant" cases and 
"large claimant" cases. 127 
A. Small Claimant Class Actions 
Traditionally, the class action format was used to aggregate small claims that 
were not worth litigating separately.m Because the claims were small, concerns over 
individualized justice were limited. Even though small claimant cases presented 
problems of agency costs and inadequate monitoring by class members, class actions 
were viewed as an effective means by which to hold defendants accountable for 
widespread harm. Securities fraud class actions are generally characterized as small 
claimant cases, as are many cases involving antitrust and consumer fraud claims.129 
Although the class action model permits and even encourages litigation in 
situations in which the damages suffered by individual class members are quite small, 
the public value of supporting litigation in which individual class members have very 
small stakes is subject to question.\Jo The Draft Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee cite the example of a two cents per month overcharge affecting two 
million customers as a case in which class certification might not be proper. \ J J  The 
filing of such cases is one of the abuses typically attributed to la�;yer-driven litigation. 
Absent the class action vehicle and, more significantly, the potential of small claim 
cases to generate substantial attorneys fees, most small claimant class actions would 
Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class A ctions ": An 
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 8 1 1 passim ( 1 995) .  
1 25 .  See, e. g., Linda S .  Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class 
Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ L. REV. 6 1 5  ( 1 997). 
1 26 .  The presence of large institutions as securities fraud class members offers a potential 
mechanism for reducing the agency costs typically associated with the small dispersed 
claimholders in a class action. Similar lead plaintiffs may not be available, for example, in  
consumer fraud cases. 
1 27.  Coffee, supra note 74, at 1 3 5 1-5 2. Class actions are also used in noneconomic cases 
ai1d have had substantial impact in areas such as civil rights law. See, e.g. , Jack Greenberg, 
Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575 
( 1 997) (describing role of class action device in civil rights litigation). 
1 28.  See, e.g. , Samuel M.  Hill,  Small Claimant Class A ctions: Deterrence and Due 
Process Examined, 19 MI. J. 1 RIAL ADVoc. 1 47 ,  1 50 ( 1 995) (defending class action format as 
enabling small claimants to litigate claims which would otherwise be economically unfeasible). 
1 29 .  See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1 35 1 -52 (describing securities and antitrust class 
actions as small claimant cases). 
130. Federal law provides one check on the use of federal court class actions to redress 
claims of trivial damage by barring the aggregation of damages suffered by individual class 
members to meet the amount in controversy requirement of diversity j urisdiction, but no such 
barrier applies to claims arising under federal statutes such as the federal securities Jaws. 
1 3 1 .  Draft Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee Apr. 1 8-1 9 , 1 996, reprinted in 1 67 
F.R.D.  539,  542 ( 1 996) (hereinafter Advisory Comntittee Minutes). 
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not be brought. Indeed, small claimant class actions are structured to provide far more 
substantial rewards to plaintiffs ' counsel than to individual class members . m  
Small claimant class actions also present a clear example of rational class 
member apathy. Because of the small stakes involved, individual class members have 
little incentive either to monitor litigation decisions or to opt out to pursue individual 
claims. This creates litigation in which plaintiffs'  counsel has both the largest 
economic stake and the greatest freedom from client oversight. This structure leads to 
additional concern about lawyer-driven l itigation. 133 
The Reform Act addresses these concerns by attempting to transfer l itigation 
control away from class counsel and back to class members through the lead plaintiff 
appointment and related provisions. The goal is to have substantial shareholders make 
the decision whether proposed litigation is worthwhile or whether, apart from 
attorneys fees, it will produce only trivial benefits. 
The proposed amendments to Rule 23 take another approach . Presumably 
evidencing concern about the absence of analogues to institutional i nvestors in  
other small claimant class action settings, the amendments place responsibility for 
determining the value of a proposed class action with the court. The amendments 
add subparagraph F to subdivision (b )(3)"' in order to reduce the use of class 
actions to aggregate trivial claims. "' Subparagraph F allows a court to make a 
preliminary determination of the merits of the litigation and, as the Advisory 
Committee notes explain, to deny certification of class actions in  which the 
probable individual relief is too small to justify the cost of litigation."• 
B oth the reform to Rule 23 and the lead plaintiff provision thus have a common 
goal of reducing the incidence of trivial cases, cases that are viewed as the product of 
lawyer-driven litigation. The extent to which trivial cases characterize federal court 
class action litigation is unclear, however.m Critics of the reform effort claim that 
trivial cases are rare. Neither high settlement rates nor small individual recoveries 
demonstrate trivial or meritless litigation; settlement is the standard procedure for 
resolving civil claims and small individual recoveries are characteristic of class action 
litigation."' 
The focus of these concerns on economic recovery to individual class members 
1 32. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The 
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and 
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 701-24 ( 1986) (developing an economic model of 
piaintiffs' attorneys' incentives to litigate). 
1 3 3 .  See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 1 9-2 1 (explaining why plaintiffs in small 
claimant cases are incapable of adequate monitoring). 
1 34. Proposed Rules, supra note 1 24, at 559. 
1 35 .  See Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 1 3 1 ,  nt 542. 
1 36 .  !d. at 544. 
1 3  7. I d. (describing Federal Judicial Center Study finding that relatively few class actions 
are filed on claims that, as pleaded, would yield trivial relief); see also Bohn & Choi, supra 
note 16, at 903 (describing empirical study attempting to evaluate extent to which securities 
fraud l i tigation in new issues market serves as a deterrent effect or is frivolous). 
1 3 8 .  Indeed, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Schutts, 472 U.S.  797 ( 1 985), the p!aintift class 
consisted of 3 3 ,000 members with claims averaging one hundred dollars each. !d. at 80 1 .  
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is also misleading."' A central value of the class action vehicle is its capacity to deter 
wrongdoing."o The private attorney general nature of class actions has been widely 
defended and is of increasing importance in an era in which the size of government 
and hence its enforcement resources are being reduced.'" The SEC itself has defended 
the deterrent effect of private securities fraud litigation as a valuable component in 
maintaining the integrity of the U.S. securities markets.'" The ability of small claimant 
cases to provide deterrence value requires that they be lawyer driven. The costs of 
litigation provide an insurmountable barrier to the use of individual claims to redress 
problems of small scale widespread wrongdoing. 
Even if lawyer-driven litigation is defensible in terms of the deterrent effect of 
litigation, the economics of small claimant class actions generate concern. The 
relationship of attorneys fees to individual class member recoveries is particularly 
problematic in that litigation costs, including attorneys fees, threaten to overwhelm 
litigant recovery. Newspaper articles describe the multimillion dollar fees awarded to 
successful plaintiffs '  firms. '" Courts appear unable carefully to scrutinize proposed 
attorneys fees, awarding the amounts requested without adjustment in most cases . '" In 
1 39 .  See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940 
( 1 975) (arguing that small claimant class action model has "nothing to do with judicial 
economy" because it enables litigation of cases that would otherwise not be brought); 
Alexander, supra note 22, at 1 508 (proposing regulatory remedy as alternative to compensation 
model of damages). 
1 40. See Stephen Berry, Ending Substance 's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for 
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299-300 
( 1 980) (observing that small claimant class actions serve deterrence rather than compensation 
goals). The ability to provide deterrence through the imposition of compensatory damages is a 
general tenet of tort law. See, e. g. , Wll..LIAM M .  LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW ( 1 987); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 
1 992); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-31 ( 1 987).  The extent to 
which private litigation results in an optimal level of deterrence depends on a variety of factors, 
including the manner in which damages are detennined. See, e.g. , E. Donald Eliiott, Why 
Punitive Damages Don 't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1 053,  1 05 7  
( 1 989) (arguing that punitive damages fail t o  provide optimal deterrence because they are 
unpredictable). 
1 4 1 .  See, e.g. , Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. B erner, 472 U.S .  299, 3 1 5  ( 1 985) 
(observing that "the securities markets have grown dramatically in  size and complexity, while 
Commission enforcement resources have declined") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 355 ,  98th Cong. ,  
1 st Sess. 6 ( 1 983)); see also Woolf v .  S.D. Cohn & Co., 5 2 1  F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1 975) 
( 'The scarce enforcement resources of the S .E.C. are adequate only to police the most flagrant 
and widespread abuses in the private placement area."). 
1 42. See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings on 
the Impact of the Supreme Court � Decision in Central Ban.'< Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1 03d Cong. ,  2d Sess. 
( 1 994) (statement of Ai'thur Levitt. Chairman, SEC) , available in 1 994 VVL 233 1 42, at * 1 0  
(defending the roie o f  private securities fraud actions as complementing SEC enforcement 
efforts); see also Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 3 1 5  (recognizing the SEC ' s  concern that it  
"does not have the resources to police the securities industry sufficiently"). 
1 43 .  See, e. g., Rutter, supra note 79 (describing attorneys fees awards totaling $227 
million for securities suits brought against high tech companies and settled during the period 
from 1991  through 1 994). 
1 44.  See Macey & r,;! il!er, supra note 8, at 43 (claiming that "judges rarely reject fee 
petitions presented as pat1 of a settlement") .  
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this regard, the Reform Act' s requirement that legal fees be limited to a reasonable 
percentage of the class recovery, a direction that fails to provide a meaningful 
substantive change from existing legal standards, appears to be, at best aspirational ."' 
Defenders of class action litigation challenge the claim that attorney fee awards 
are too high. Plaintiffs '  lawyers argue that they bear substantial risks in pursuing class 
action litigation and expend substantial resources investigating and prosecuting 
cases.1'' To the extent that large attorneys fees compensate plaintiffs ' lawyers for these 
costs, a large fee award is not a windfall .  More telling, perhaps, is the fact that, 
because litigation costs are a function of risk and litigation effort, they are high 
relative to litigant recovery in many cases in which litigation is appropriate. 
An example is provided by the Apple Computer case, one of the rare securities 
fraud cases to proceed to trial on the merits . The case, which involved allegations that 
Apple and its officers failed properly to disclose information concerning problems in 
the development of a new computer,147 Lisa, resulted in  an initial jury verdict of  $ 1 00 
million against the individual defendants-presumably an indication that the case was 
not frivolous.14' The jury found in favor of the corporate defendant, however, and 
following the trial court's decision to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the ground that the jury verdicts were inconsistent, the case was settled for $ 1 9  
million. Of the settlement proceeds, plaintiffs' lawyers received $9 million, defense 
lawyers got $6 million and the Apple shareholders got approximately $2 million. 1" 
Although this recovery to Apple shareholders was small both in absolute terms and 
relative to the costs of the litigation, it is difficult to attack the decision to file a 
complaint that resulted in a jury award of $ 1 00 million in damages. Nor does a $9 
million attorneys fee appear unreasonable in light of the litigation efforts provided by 
plaintiffs' counsel. 
Defending small claimant class actions in terms of their deterrence value rather 
than in terms of compensation raises a second concern: whether private litigation is 
superior in achieving deterrence to enforcement efforts by government agencies. 1'0 
State and federal law enforcement organizations have the ability to investigate and 
punish cases involving widespread small scale fraud and offer an alternative means by 
which to address wrongful conduct. 1 ' 1  Scholars have debated the relative efficiency of 
1 45 .  See id. at 46-6 1 (describing difficulties associated with judicial review of attorneys 
fee requests). 
1 46.  See, e. g., Coffee, supra note 1 32, at 703 (describing risks and opportunity costs for 
plaintiffs' l awyers) ;  Bohn & Choi, supra note 1 6, at 925-26 (describing plaintiffs ' l awyers' 
arguments that fee awards should compensate them for the risks associated with class action 
litigation). 
1 47 .  See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 386 F.2d 1 1 09 (9th Cir. 1 989) (describing 
plaintiffs' allegations). 
1 4 8 .  See Rutter, supra note 79 (describing initial verdict). 
1 49 .  !d. (describing terms of settlement and attorney fee a·-.vards). 
1 50.  See generally Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the 
Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases 
Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 1 63,  1 220-21 ( 1 936) (analyzing relationship of private actions to 
government enforcement in antitrust area and finding that most private cases are not follow-om; 
to government actions). 
1 5 1 .  See, e. g. , i'/Jichigan Attorney General Kelley SLams Telephone Slammers, ?R 
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the private attorney general structure versus government enforcement, a question that 
is beyond the scope of this Article."' 
Efficiency may not be the only relevant question, however. The tradeoff between 
public and private enforcement requires society to address a number of issues that 
have received little attention in the debate over class action reform. Concerns about 
limiting the size of government and political pressure to reduce expenditures on 
public enforcement support increased reliance on private enforcement."' In contrast, 
private enforcement reduces the accountability of the law enforcement effort and 
delegates to plaintiffs' counsel, rather than to the political process, the control over 
enforcement priorities.'" Although a system in which enforcement decisions are a 
function of the profitability of litigation appears to provide a poor fit with social 
benefit, the legal system can influence plaintiffs '  litigation decisions by modifying 
substantive law to disfavor particular types of claims."' If, for example, litigation over 
forward-looking statements is socially wasteful or producing overdeterrence, the 
frequency of such litigation can be reduced through the adoption of legislative reform 
such as the Reform Act's safe harbor.m Conversely, legislation can increase litigation 
incentives in areas in which private enforcement is considered particularly 
valuable-an example is the availability of treble damages in private antitrust 
litigation. '" 
In sum, although plaintiffs' lawyers may exercise substantial control over the 
small claimant class action, the causal connection between this control and the 
shortcomings associated with class action litigation is far from obvious. More 
importantly, the problems with the existing structure are unlikely to be remedied by 
institutional controls, whether those controls are supplied by class members, as with 
the lead plaintiff provision, or by the courts under the proposed amendment to Rule 
Newswire, Oct. 23, 1 996, available in LEXIS, News Library, PR News File (describing 
settlement between seven states and telephone company accused of improperly switching 
subscribers away from their preferred long distance carrier). 
1 52.  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & George J.  Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 ( 1 974); William B reit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, 
Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 405, 4 1 3  ( 1 985); cf 
Warren F. S chwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 
1 075, 1 082 ( 1 980) (arguing that public enforcement of antitrust law is more efficient than 
private enforcement). 
1 5 3 .  See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to 
the Private Securities Litigation Refoml Act of 1995, 5 1  Bus . LAW. 335,  378 ( 1 996) (warning 
that it may be "unrealistic" to rely on SEC enforcement to replace the effects of private 
litigation "in an era of governmental austerity"). 
1 54.  See Coffee, supra note 1 32,  at 684-9 1 (analyzing disparity between private and 
social incentives to litigate and concluding that existing legal structure is likely to produce 
underfunding of private enforcement efforts). 
1 55 .  See Kauper & Snyder, supra note 1 50, at 1 067 (describing "equilibrating tendency" 
of procedural aspects to balance for substantive provisions of the law). 
1 5 6. Refom1 Act, supra note 3 (adding Sec. Act § 27 A; Sec. Ex. Act § 2 1 E). Cf Bohn 
& Choi, supra note 1 6, at 980 (suggesting that most suits directed at initial public offerings are 
frivolous and recowmending lawmakers consider desirability of allowing such suits). 
1 57 .  See Kauper & Snyder, supra note 1 50, at 1 05 1  (predicting that a decrease in the 
treble damage multiple would decrease deterrence of antitrust violations). 
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23. 
B. Large Claimant Class Actions 
Class action reform efforts do not focus exclusively on small claimant cases. 
Rather, small claimant cases are a shrinking sector of the class action landscape. They 
have been largely superseded, as has much else in the law, by the mass tort case, the 
prototypical large claimant case.'" In spite of the explicit instructions of the drafters of 
Rule 23 that it was not intended for use in mass tort cases,'" the class action has 
become the vehicle of choice to deal with the issues of competing claimants, technical 
complexities in legal and factual analysis, defendants with limited funds, and the 
temporal inequalities posed by cases in which both class and discovery periods span 
decades.'60 
The problems affecting the large claimant case are quite different from those of 
the small claimant class action. Large claimant cases have raised concerns about the 
capacity of the class action format to provide individualized justice, the degree to 
which class counsel can effectively represent differing needs of class members, and 
the relative importance of common issues in the certification decision.'•' Recent cases 
in areas such as asbestos litigation also present the problem of addressing the needs of 
potential or future class members who do not, as of the time of the litigation, have a 
ripe claim. '•' 
A number of these issues are especially troubling in the context of settlement. 
Courts in mass tort and other large claimant cases have embraced the general judicial 
policy of favoring settlement,'" based in part on concerns about congestion of judicial 
dockets and the perceived efficiency of centralizing the resolution of complex legal 
and factual issues. '  .. Because of the peculiar incentive structure of large claimant class 
1 58 .  See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1 344-45 (describing recent evolution of class action to 
focus on mass tort cases). 
1 59 .  Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 ( 1 966) (stating that a '"mass accident' 
resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action"); for 
further h istorical research, see Judith Resnik, From "Cases " to "Litigation," LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991  at 5 ,  9- 14. 
1 60. See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of 
Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 ( 1 995) (describing obstacles in litigation of mass torts that 
have motivated efforts to use class action format as a resolution). 
1 6 1 .  See, e.g. , Koniak, supra note 8, at 1 048 (describing flaws in class action mechanism 
for addressing large mass tort cases). 
1 62. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc. ,  83 F.3d 6 1 0, 626, 630 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 
1 17 S. Ct. 379 ( 1 996) (denying request for certification of settlement class, in part, because of 
difficulty in addressing the interests of future claimants and observing substantial conflict 
between the interests of presently injured and "futures" class members) ; see also Note, And 
Justiciability for All?: Future injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of Powers, 1 09 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 066 ( 1 996) (addressing the justiciability of futures claims). 
1 63 .  See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 8 ,  at 45-46 (describing judicial incentive to 
approve settlements) ; In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig. ,  6 1 8  F. Supp. 735 ,  740 
(S.D.N.Y. 1 985), af!'d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1 986) (stating that "a bad settlement is almost 
always better than a good trial"). 
1 64. See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1 462-63 (describing pressure faced by courts in mass 
tort cases to approve settlements notwithstanding "suspicious signs of collusion"). 
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action settlements, an incentive structure that only partially resembles the model 
applicable in securities fraud cases, defendants in these cases have begun to 
encourage use of the class action vehicle as a way of limiting their liability. '" 
Commentators have identified this opportunity for collusion . ' .. In particular, 
defendants in mass tort cases have an incentive to search for and negotiate with the 
plaintiffs' counsel willing to agree to the lowest settlement amount.'" 
This has led to the presentation, in some recent cases, of proposed settlements 
before a complaint has even been filed. '" Litigants have argued that, consistent with 
the policy of encouraging settlement, courts should apply certification standards more 
liberally in these cases and should certify cases for settlement that might not meet the 
normal prerequisites of Rule 23. Indeed, the proposed revisions to Rule 23 expressly 
endorse the use of settlement classes by permitting certification of a subdivision 
(b)(3) class for settlement purposes in circumstances in which the class would not 
otherwise be certifiable. '" 
Interestingly, this reform threatens to move large claimant class actions closer to 
lawyer-driven litigation, by making them more similar to small claimant cases. The 
proposed broader certification procedure, coupled with the practice of pre-negotiated 
settlements, enhances lawyer control by providing the opportunity to structure a 
settlement outside the normal litigation process. This reduces the ability of courts and 
class members to monitor the settlement decision. The cost of investigating and 
objecting to a proposed settlement may be high and, even for an individual litigant 
with a substantial stake, the cost of monitoring may outweigh the benefits. This is 
particularly true because, for a large claimant, the option of opting out and pursuing 
an individual claim provides a realistic alternative to objecting to an unsatisfactory 
settlement."0 
The nature of the stakes of some putative class members in large claimant mass 
tort cases can also reduce the incentive to monitor. Cases like Georgine'" propose 
settlements that would adjudicate the rights of future claimants, those who have 
suffered exposure, for example, but are not yet sick.172 These plaintiffs are particularly 
ill-equipped to monitor plaintiffs '  counsel and determine if they are being adequately 
represented as a group-their expected damages even if high must be discounted by 
the possibility that they will never suffer an injury. At the time a court is deciding 
1 65 .  ld. at 1 35 0  (explaining how class action can serve as a "shield for defendants"). 
1 66. See, e.g., id. at 1 367-84 (describing possible forms of collusion in class action 
settlements). 
1 67.  Professor Coffee terms this problem "structural collusion." !d. at 1 354. 
1 68 .  See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig . ,  
55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 1 1 6 S.  Ct. 88 ( 1 995) (considering the propriety and 
prerequisites for certification of a settlement class); Georgine v. Amchem Prods. , Inc . ,  83 F.3d 
at 626, 630 (same). 
1 69.  Proposed Rules, supra note 1 24, at 559 (adding Rule 23(b)(4)). 
1 70. See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1 450 (describing opt-out as a checking mechai1ism on 
the value of settlements). 
1 7 1 .  Georgine v. Amchem Prods. ,  83 F.3d at 6 1 0. 
1 72. See id. at 6 1 7-1 8 (describing fairness concerns created by inclusion of future 
claimants within putative plaintiff class). 
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whether to approve a settlement, some of these futures plaintiffs may not even realize 
that they are members of the plaintiff class. Thus the concern about lawyer-driven 
litigation might appropriately be focused on the proposal that Rule 23 be amended to 
allow certification of settlement classes."' 
The concerns about abuse and collusion in large claimant class actions can 
similarly provide additional insight into the operation of the lead plaintiff provision. 
Although securities fraud cases have traditionally been viewed as small claimant 
cases, the increasing representation of institutional investors as class members casts 
some doubt upon the accuracy of this characterization. Institutional investors have 
large stakes in securities fraud class actions, both in absolute terms and relative to the 
interests of the rest of the class. Weiss and B eckerman report that losses of large 
claimants in securities fraud cases averaged over $ 1  million. If the lead plaintiff 
provision succeeds in increasing institutional participation, these large stakes may 
cause securities fraud litigation to take on some of the litigation characteristics 
generally associated with large claimant class actions. Although predicting the 
evolution of securities fraud litigation under this scenario is necessarily tentative, the 
experience of large claimant mass tort cases suggests two possible changes in the 
conduct of securities litigation. 
First, motivating institutional investors to take securities fraud litigation more 
seriously creates an enhanced risk that institutions may choose to opt out of  class 
actions in the same way that individual large claimants may opt out of  other types 
of class actions, rather than seeking to exert greater control within the class action 
format. An institution's  participation as lead plaintiff in a class action may subj ect 
the institution to the traditional disadvantages associated with opting out and 
litigating separately, including identifiability, submitting to discovery, and 
incurring monitoring costs . If the institution is willing to incur these costs by active 
participation, it may be more advantageous for it to go all the way and pursue an 
individual action, in which the problems of free riding and administrative expense 
are reduced. 
Second, the large claimant class action offers securities fraud defendants a model 
for opportunistic or even collusive negotiations with institutional plaintiffs. Securities 
defendants may follow the lead of defendants in recent mass tort cases and approach 
institutional investors in hopes of negotiating favorable settlement terms. Defendants' 
incentive to negotiate may be increased by uncertainty about the manner in which 
courts will apply substantive provisions of the Reform Act. Institutions may be 
particularly receptive to these offers of negotiated settlement because participation in 
a friendly or negotiated context will not jeopardize an institution's  reputation with 
issuers or require the institution to submit to burdensome discovery. '" 
Negotiated settlements thus offer a better prospect of institutional participation 
1 73 .  See Advisory Committee Minutes, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 5 5 1 -5 5  (discussing debate 
over proposed amendment allowing certification of settlement classes). 
1 74.  See, e. g., Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 63-66 (describing process by \Vhich 
defendants may prefer atypical plaintiffs as class representatives because their p articipation 
may facilitate easy settlements). 
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than hostile litigation. Institutions that would not have sought lead plaintiff status 
because of a desire to protect ongoing business relationships with issuers or because 
of political constraints may be willing to participate for the limited purpose of 
implementing a negotiated settlement. This participation itself may be problematic, 
however, in that institutions subject to these concerns may not be capable of 
exercising independent judgment in connection with the settlement process. An 
institutional investor concerned about remaining on friendly terms may not 
adequately defend the interests of the plaintiff class. Thus, although the settlement 
decision may reflect client rather than lawyer control ,  it need not improve the degree 
to which settlement reflects the merits of the cases. 1 75 This failure would seriously 
undermine the purported value of the lead plaintiff provision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite widespread disagreement about the extent to which reform of the 
securities fraud class action was necessary, Congress enacted sweeping changes 
through its adoption of the Reform Act. A similar movement is afoot in the proposals 
to reform Rule 23. The proposals for reform share a common ground: the desire to 
address concerns about lawyer control over litigation and settlement decisions in the 
class action context. In both cases, critics attribute the filing of frivolous litigation and 
the resolution of cases on terms that have insufficient relationship to the merits to the 
fact that lawyers, rather than clients, are the primary decisionmakers. 
Upon reflection, it appears that critics have been allowing lawyer-driven 
litigation to serve as a scapegoat and to bear too much of the responsibility for 
deficiencies in the litigation process. As a result, the capacity of the reform proposals 
to return litigation control to class members is unclear, and the impact of reform on 
litigation decisions is uncertain. 
The transsubstantive nature of this symposium provides a rare opportunity for a 
fuller evaluation of the merits of the reform proposals. The observed developments in 
class action litigation outside the securities area, particularly in the context of mass 
tort cases, offer new insights into the likely consequences of the procedural changes 
adopted by the Reform Act, particularly the lead plaintiff provision. Similarly, the 
recently enacted reforms to the federal securities laws and the initial experience with 
the lead plaintiff provision suggest additional factors to consider in connection with 
reform of Rule 23. It is far too early to judge the impact of the Reform Act upon 
securities fraud class actions. The questions raised by the lead plaintiff provision, 
however, suggest a need for greater attention to the purposes of class action litigation 
and the extent to which reform proposals are tailored to those purposes than the 
attention reflected in the legislative history of the Reform Act. 
1 7 5 .  Alternatively, the new procedures may simply transfer control of the litigation from 
the plaintiffs' bar to the defense bar. See Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional 
After the Private Securities Litigation Refomz Act of 1995, 50 S.M.U. L. REv. 9 1 ,  1 1 5 ( 1 996) 
(describing further possibility for collusion in that the defense bar can now create stables of 
"sweetheart plaintiffs" with substantial shareholdings who are both able to displace filing 
plaintiffs and willing to agree to easy settlements). 
